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by the Current US Immigration Regime
IntroductIon
The emphasis on securitization in the US’s current immigra-
tion regime has led to a wide range of developments that have 
had detrimental consequences for undocumented immigrants, 
including the convergence of criminal and immigration law 
(Stumpf), the emphasis on detention, deterrence, and deporta-
tion, as well as the extension of the US’s immigration control 
across national boundaries (Messmer). Taken together, these 
measures have substantially expanded the number of deport-
able offenses, have increased the “liminally legal” immigrant 
population (Menjívar, Cebulko), and have often led to so-called 
“legal forms of violence” (Menjívar and Abrego). While these 
developments have affected all undocumented immigrants, 
they are particularly harmful for children and adolescents liv-
ing in irregular or mixed-status immigrant families, a segment 
of the US population whose special needs have not yet been 
acknowledged sufficiently by current immigration laws and poli-
cies. In 2016, approximately 18 million (26%) of 70 million US 
children under the age of 18 lived with at least one immigrant 
parent (Migration Policy Institute), and according to Thron-
son, these children constitute the fastest-growing segment 
of the US’s child population (240). Moreover, two-thirds of all 
children living in mixed-status families are US citizens (241). 
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citizen children […] live with at least one family member who is 
unauthorized” (Mathema).1 
To date, the complexity of the US’s under-age population living 
in irregular immigrant or mixed-status families is just begin-
ning to be explored. For far too long, US immigration policies 
have tended to regard children as “appendages” to immigrant 
adults (Bhabha, Child Migration 2). Yet these children raise 
a lot of questions that differ from the issues raised by adult 
immigrants due to their heightened vulnerability and complex 
legal position, but there are also specific challenges that are 
created by them. Not acknowledging these differences will lead 
to confused, unsatisfactory, or even oppressive migration poli-
cies. In an attempt to create awareness of the specific needs 
as well as the complex situation of immigrant children, several 
recent studies have focused on the so-called 1.5 generation, 
a term that was developed by sociologist Rubén G. Rumbaut 
to refer to undocumented children/adolescents who were 
brought to the US by their undocumented parents at a young 
age (Gonzales, Lives 6). Most of these studies draw a clear dis-
tinction between these undocumented youth and US citizen 
children born to undocumented parents because the second 
group—in principle—enjoys full citizenship rights. In this essay I will 
demonstrate, however, that US citizen children living with one 
or more undocumented parent(s) have much more in common 
with the so-called 1.5 generation than with their US citizen peers 
because in pretty much all areas of life, the irregular immigra-
tion status of (one of) their parents seems to determine their 
de-facto life chances, irrespective of their de-jure legal status. 
My central argument is that the current US immigration regime 
is too strongly adult-centered and in this way not only system-
atically disenfranchises immigrant children; it also structurally 
1. Mathema also notes that “California, Texas, and Nevada […] have the highest 
percent of US-born population with at least one unauthorized family member 
living with them. But even states with smaller immigrant populations, such as Ne-
braska, Arkansas, and Kansas, […] have high percentages of naturalized citizens 
who have unauthorized family members living in the same household. […] These 
estimates are by their nature conservative since they do not include an account-





















disadvantages US citizen children living in irregular immigrant 
or mixed-status families as the parents’ irregular status in effect 
overrules and frequently extinguishes their childrens’ citizen 
status. In Means without End, Giorgio Agamben argues that 
the refugee “brings a radical crisis to the principles of the nation-
state and clears the way for a renewal of categories that can 
no longer be delayed” (22–23). In analogy to this, I would argue 
that analyzing the US’s current immigration regime through 
the lens of under-age youth can bring a radical crisis to this 
system by revealing fundamental inconsistencies, calling into 
question seemigly clear-cut binaries, and challenging us to rethink 
the socio-lecal construction of “illegality” by problematizing 
overly facile assumptions and categorizations. 
More specifically, I maintain that both immigrant children 
as well as US citizen children living in irregular immigrant or mixed-
status families can function as an enabling prism to highlight 
the extent to which current US immigration laws and policies 
dominate, override, or collide with other national and inter-
national legal practices and produce inherently contradictory 
or paradoxical situations; they can throw into relief the extent 
to which children (even US citizen children) lack sufficient agency 
and voice in current US immigration law; and they can foreground 
the deleterial consequences of the current immigration regime’s 
prioritization of deterrence and deportation for one of the most 
vulnerable segments of the US population. Drawing on socio-
logical and ethnographic research that features migrant youth 
case studies, I will, in the following, first look at the situation 
of irregular immigrant children coming of age in the US. Build-
ing on studies of the 1.5 generation by Roberto Gonzales, Kara 
Cebulko, and Lisa Martinez, among others, who have identified 
the impossibility to attend college as one of the most crucial 
problems faced by this group, I will argue that not even DACA, 
which was introduced to eliminate this roadblock, can offer 
sufficient protection and alleviate this group’s vulnerable sta-
tus completely. In the second part I will then turn to US citizen 
children living in irregular immigrant or mixed-status families 
to highlight the extent to which US immigration law trumps other 
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(national and international) legal principles and in the process 
leads to a systematic devaluation of US citizenship rights.
1. narratIves of Wasted talent: 1.5 GeneratIon  
ImmIGrant Youth and the lImIted ProtectIon ProvIded bY daca
On July 25, 2018, the Justice Department instructed US attor-
neys by email “not to use the term ‘undocumented’ immigrants 
and instead refer to someone illegally in the US as ‘an illegal 
alien.’” The reason given for this rhetorical reframing was that 
“[t]he word ‘undocumented’ is not based in US code and should 
not be used to describe someone’s illegal presence in the country” 
(Kopan). This change in terminology reverses the Associated 
Press’s Stylebook initiative of 2013 “to not describe a person 
as illegal, only actions” (Kopan) and constitutes a recent example 
of the extent to which the debate on irregular migration has 
grown harsher. Much of the public and media rhetoric is currently 
dominated by terms that evoke seemingly clear-cut distinctions 
between “good” and “bad”: legal vs. illegal; American vs. alien; 
deserving vs. undeserving immigrant. While such a reductionist 
form of classification fails to capture the reality of many immi-
grants’ lives, it becomes particularly questionable in the context 
of child migrants who were brought to the US by their parents 
at a young age (the so-called 1.5 generation). As pretty much 
all studies confirm, most of these children and youth culturally 
identify as “American” because they were socialized during their 
most important formative years by the US public school system. 
In its 1982 verdict Plyler vs. Doe, the Supreme Court had granted 
all undocumented children access to the US’s K-12 public school 
system by ruling that “unauthorized migrant children are people 
‘in any ordinary sense of the term’” and are therefore “entitled 
to state-funded public education for primary and secondary 
schooling” (Bhabha, Child Migration 249, 274).2 
2. Cf. also “[T]he Supreme Court held that states cannot constitutionally 
deny students a free public education on account of their immigration status” 
(Golash-Boza, Forced Out 85). “Citing the ‘pivotal role of education,’ in the life 
of a child and the nation, Justice William Brennan noted in his verdict that, 
while education is not a fundamental right, denying K-12 education to un-





















Thus, for many undocumented immigrant children who complete 
their K-12 education in the US, their country of birth is frequently 
nothing but a distant memory. As former President Obama con-
firmed in his DACA speech in June 2012: “These are young people 
who study in our schools, they play in our neighborhoods, they’re 
friends with our kids, they pledge allegiance to our flag. They are 
Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every single way but one: 
on paper” (White House). For many of these 1.5 generation youth, 
the dichotomy American vs. alien thus does not make much 
sense. School, moreover, is seen by this generation of immigrant 
kids as a pathway to upward social mobility: these children were 
“raised with the expectation that as adults they would find better 
opportunities than those afforded to their parents” (Gonzales, 
Lives 7). They speak English fluently, they identify with American 
values such as meritocracy and hard work, and they have high 
expectations for their future, in many ways assuming they will 
have career trajectories similar to those of their US citizen peers. 
Nothing could be further from the truth, however, for the majo-
rity of this group of young people, as has been documented in detail 
by Roberto Gonzales, Kara Cebulko, and Lisa Martinez, among 
others. Gonzales, who has devoted several studies to analyzing 
the life paths of members of the 1.5 generation, has observed that 
when these young people turn into adults, their coming of age leads 
to radical disillusionment. As children, not least because of their 
integration into the public school system, their undocumented 
status did not impede them in any significant way (Gonzales, 
“Learning” 605). When they get older, however, they realize that 
they cannot participate in many adult activities such as getting 
a driver’s licence, taking part-time jobs, or applying for college (605; 
cf. also Gonzales, Lives xix-xx). In other words, when the children 
of unauthorized immigrants grow up, they experience a radical 
crete class of children not accountable for their disabling status’” (Gonzales, 
Lives 11). Brennan continued: “It is difficult to understand precisely what 
the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation or a perpetuation 
of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems 
and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever 
savings might be achieved by denying these children an education, they are 
wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the state, 
and the Nation” (qtd. in Bhabha, Child Migration 274).
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shift in status from quasi-legal and socially integrated to illegal 
(Gonzales, “Learning” 602). This means that “undocumented 
children move from protected to unprotected status, from inclu-
sion to exclusion” (602); from being just like other American kids 
to being a deportable alien; from being citizens-in-the-making 
(Lind 298) to being “a new, disenfranchised underclass” (Gonzales, 
“Learning” 603); or, as Gonzales phrases it, when they come 
of age, “they must learn to be illegal” (602). They thus acquire 
a paradoxical and contradictory status according to which they 
are “culturally integrated but legally excluded”: there exists a gap 
“between individual feelings of belonging and the exclusion enforced 
by the society in which they live” (Gonzales, Lives 7). 
The number of young people who experience this dramatic shift 
towards illegality and exclusion is quite substantial as “[a]n estima- 
ted 65,000 undocumented or legally uncertain students gradu-
ate from high schools throughout the United States every year” 
(Menjívar and Abrego 1411). One central problem faced by these 
young people is the fact that, due to their undocumented status, 
they are often unable to attend university or apply for jobs that are 
commensurate with their level of education. As one of Cebulko’s 
interviewees formulated this dilemma: “[after graduating from 
high school] I felt like my life had come to a stop and I wasn’t 
allowed to move forward, to reach my dreams, ‘cause there was 
this huge wall in front of me. And my future didn’t depend on me, 
but on the government, and whether or not they allowed me 
to go to school” (qtd. in “Double Jeopardy” 77). Another example is 
Rafael, whose parents migrated from Zacatecas, Mexico, to the US 
when he was six years old.3 Even though he was lucky to be able 
to attend college on a full-tuition scholarship from a private fund 
in Colorado, he was only able to get a job in retail afterwards, unlike 
his friends with the same degree: “I can’t really work in my field 
because everything that is in my field requires a background check 
and requires some type of traveling or something I am not able 
to do” (Martinez 61). 
Gonzales observes that none of his interviewees “had been 
able to legally pursue an occupation that made use of his or her 





















educational credentials or professional preparation” (Lives 191), 
and at some point, these young people realize that the only jobs 
they can get are similar to those of their undocumented parents.4 
In other words, no intergeneral progress, no social mobility is pos-
sible for 1.5 generation immigrant children (Gonzales, “Learning” 
616). Gonzales thus concludes that at the turn to adulthood, ille-
gality becomes “the most salient feature of their lives” (Lives 7), 
a kind of “master status” (15) that “trump[s] their achievements 
and overwhelm[s] almost all of their roles,” irrespective of their 
educational background (178); it becomes a “stranglehold” that 
determines these young people’s lives more than any other variable 
(179).5 Gonzales also notes that frequently, such an “experience 
of shattered dreams and expulsion” (202) can lead to “anxieties, 
chronic sadness, depression, over- or undereating, difficulty sleeping, 
and [a] desire to ‘not start the day’” (200). In one dramatic case, 
it even led to suicide. Gonzales reports that on November 25, 2011, 
eighteen-year-old Joaquin Luna Jr. of Mission, Texas, a teen who had 
come to  the  United States as  a  six-month-old infant, took his own 
life. Despairing that his undocumented status would block his abil-
ity to achieve his dreams to go to college, he drafted goodbye letters 
to relatives, friends, and teachers. In a letter addressed to Jesus Christ, 
he wrote: “I’ve realized that I have no chance in becoming a civil engi-
4. Janet, working for a maid service, said: “I cried every day after work 
for the first two months […] . I can’t believe this is my life. When I was in school 
I never thought I’d be doing this” (qtd. in Gonzales, “Learning” 612). Cf. also 
Marita, who works the same job as her mum and wonders: “Why did I even 
go to school?” (qtd. in Gonzales, “Learning” 614). 
5. Gonzales cites the example of Esperanza, who had changed “from an out-
wardly confident, wide-eyed university student with ‘big plans for the future’ 
to a socially withdrawn, inwardly focused adult who seemed to have the weight 
of the world on her shoulders” (Lives 197). She tells him: “I have grown up, 
but I feel like I’m moving backwards. And I can’t do anything about it. I had 
much more freedom in school. Like, I had rights, you know. Now I can’t do 
anything by myself and it makes me feel so helpless” (197). She continues: 
“I can’t choose where I live. I can’t choose where I work. And the worst thing is 
that I can’t choose my friends”; “I can’t do anything that is eighteen and over 
[…] . I can only hang out where little kids hang out. I can’t hang out with them 
[former high school friends]. I can’t travel with them. I can’t go out to dinner 
with them. I can’t go to Vegas with them. If I want to go to a bar, I don’t even 
have a drink” (197). 
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neer the ways I’ve always dreamed of here […] so I’m planning on going 
to you.” (qtd. in Lives 199)
In many ways, DACA, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
program, an executive order signed into law by former President 
Barack Obama in August 2012, was an attempt to alleviate this 
problem by providing not only legal access to higher education 
but also a work permit for eligible young undocumented people. 
DACA “grants temporary reprieve from deportation as well 
as a work permit to youth who arrived in the United States prior 
to the age of fifteen and have completed high school” (Golash-Boza, 
Forced Out 52). DACA recipients can also get Advance Parole that 
allows them “to travel outside the United States for humanitarian, 
educational, or employment purposes” (Martinez 63). In this way, 
DACA seems to remove most of the roadblocks that many young 
undocumented immigrants experienced upon coming of age. Zaíra, 
a Guatemalan immigrant aged 21, expresses her excitiement about 
DACA thus: “It just feels like all of my dreams are finally opening 
up to me” (qtd. in Cebulko and Silver 1563). And Cebulko and Silver 
conclude that students eligible for DACA can now finally reap 
the benefits of their education and feel they are “legit” (1564).
The number of youth profiting from DACA is significant. To date, 
800,000 so-called DREAMers have received DACA protections 
between 2012 and 2017, and 690,000 DREAMers are currently 
enrolled in DACA (Gomez).6 Gonzales, however, notes that DACA 
has come too late for many of those 1.5 generation immigrants 
that he interviewed, and he also observes that by 2015, “of those 
potentially eligible for the program, more than half had not applied” 
(Lives 226). Some of the reasons included difficulties providing 
evidence of continuous residence or financial barriers (since DACA 
does not offer access to federal financial aid, college access without 
financial support remained illusory for many) (226). But Gonzales’s 
main point of criticism is that DACA focuses so centrally on college 
access, in this way privileging educational high achievers and thus 
at least indirectly creating and maintaining a distinction between 
“deserving” and “undeserving” immigrant youth (26–27). 
6. 97% of all DACA recipients are working or enrolled in school while 900 





















Apart from Gonzales’s important point of critique, I would 
argue that DACA also has several other serious limitations. 
In theory, as mentioned above, DACA enables recipients to travel 
abroad and return legally to the US, but in practice, many DACA 
recipients avoid foreign travel because they are afraid that they 
might not be allowed to re-enter. Roberta d’Antona, for example, 
a Brazilian immigrant, is covered by DACA but fears not being able 
to re-enter if she travels to Brazil to visit her relatives because in her 
view, much depends on the goodwill of the person conducting 
the re-entry interview (Cebulko, “Double Jeopardy” 81).
Yet apart from such potential risks, one of DACA’s most pro-
blematic limitations consists in its temporary nature: DACA does 
not provide any path to citizenship, nor does it offer the possibility 
to extend protection to immediate family members. In this way, 
DACA cannot offer any security or stability in the face of the US’s 
current emphasis on managing immigration flows through deter-
rence, detention and deportation. In his DACA announcement, 
former President Obama confirmed that this emphasis on tempo-
rariness was indeed a quite deliberate strategy to increase DACA’s 
political acceptance: “Now, let’s be clear—this is not amnesty, this 
is not immunity. This is not a path to citizenship. It’s not a per-
manent fix. This is a temporary stopgap measure that lets us 
focus our resources wisely while giving a degree of relief and hope 
to talented, driven, patriotic young people” (White House). Given 
the current insecure future of DACA under President Trump,7 
the temporariness of this measure produces an even higher sense 
of vulnerability, threat, and anxiety among its recipients.
By legalizing the status of its beneficiaries, but only tempo-
rarily, DACA can be said to place eligible young people in a state 
of “liminal legality.” This term was first introduced by Cecilia 
Menjívar in reference to Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants 
with Temporary Protected Status8 (“a permanently temporary 
7. Trump had announced to end the program on March 5, 2018, but the deadline 
has expired and still no permanent solution is in sight; renewals of protection 
are still accepted at this point, but no one can say for how long.
8. TPS beneficiaries have the right to work, but don’t have access to social 
services; TPS also restricts international travel (Advance Parole is necessary) 
(Menjívar 1008, 1018).
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status” [1001]).9 Menjívar builds on Victor Turner’s concept of limi-
nality and defines it as “the gray areas between documented 
and undocumented” (1004). She argues that “[t]he immigrants’ 
uncertain legality transforms them into ‘transitional beings,’” 
a temporary condition “which for many Central Americans has 
extended indefinitely” (1007, 1008). In this way, “immigration 
law has effectively produced a population of longtime residents 
with suspended lives” (1015). She continues to argue that this 
form of liminal legality is currently on the increase and coexists 
with a “reduced access to permanent legality”; it is a result 
of “the tightening of immigration laws when national security 
is paramount” (1005) because “stiffer immigration laws seek 
not only to reduce the number of immigrants entering the country, 
but also to keep more of them in undetermined legal statuses” 
(1009). In many ways, one could argue that DACA has precisely this 
effect of keeping a specific group of undocumented immigrants 
in a liminally legal and hence indefinitely vulnerable position while 
reducing (or de facto negating) their chances to acquire perma-
nent legality. As one DACA recipient termed it: “they are putting 
the rug under my feet but they can pull it out at any time” (qtd. 
in Cebulko, “Documented” 160). 
A second aspect that seriously limits the benefits of DACA 
is the fact that it has been implemented differently in different 
states, which means that DACA recipients can experience radically 
diverse scenarios depending on where they live. On the one hand, 
this can be attributed to the fact that each state had to translate 
this federal policy measure into appropriate state-level applications. 
But in addition, many individual states have recently also star-
ted to take immigration matters into their own hands and have 
implemented state-level laws that openly and deliberately collide 
with federal-level regulations. Cebulko and Silver in this context 
talk about a “mounting anti-immigrant legislation at the state 
and local levels” (1554). As Gonzales has noted: “Between 2005 
and 2011, state legislative activity focused on immigration incre-
ased more than fivefold” from 39 enacted bills in 2005 to 306 
in 2011 (Lives 22–23). As a result, in many states “local restricitive 
9. It has subsequently also been used by Karen Cebulko in reference to 1.5 





















laws can curtail access to employment, housing, higher education, 
driver’s licences and identification, and social services and can 
facilitate local police cooperation in immigration law enforcement” 
(Golash-Boza, Forced Out 87). 
Kara Cebulko and Alexis Silver have compared the implementa-
tion of DACA in two states: Massachusetts (an immigrant-friendly 
state) and North Carolina (a hostile one), and they note that in North 
Carolina, “state policies continued to impede mobility pathways 
and differentiate previously undocumented youth as outsiders 
even after the passage of DACA” (1553). This was accomplished 
by intruducing special driver’s licences, for example, that contain 
the added, stigmatizing phrase: “Legal presence no lawful status” 
(1559). In this way, “immigrants can simultaneously experience 
movements toward inclusion at the federal level while they face 
exclusionary policies at the state level, or vice versa” (1557).
In addition to Massachusetts, one could add California here 
as an interesting example of an immigrant-friendly state. During 
the 1990s, California was known for its harsh anti-immigrant 
policy measures (e.g. Propositions 187 and 209), but in the mean-
time, the situation has changed quite substantially. California 
currently allows undocumented youth to pay in-state tuition 
at public colleges and universities (Golash-Boza, Forced Out 87). 
Moreover, “[t]he California DREAM Act (2011) provided access 
to state financial aid at California state institutions of higher edu-
cation; California AB-60 (2015) provided access to driver’s licences 
for all undocumented migrants” (87); AB-263 and SB-66 “target 
employers who retaliate against workers by threatening to report 
their immigration status” (Gonzales, Lives 24); and AB-1025 even 
allows those undocumented immigrants who pass the state bar 
exam to become attorneys (24). Given this immigrant-friendly 
climate, it is perhaps not surprising that California currently has 
by far the largest number of DACA recipients: 424,995 (“DACA 
Recipients by State”).10
While California has taken the lead in creating a more hospitable 
climate for irregular immigrants in general, several other states 
have followed suit in matters that are of special importance 
10. In Arizona, the state with the second-highest DACA population, the num-
ber is 51,503 (“DACA Recipients by State”).
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to immigrant youth: 18 states have currently adopted in-state 
tuition policies, and as of mid-2018, 12 states (plus the District 
of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) allow undo-
cumented immigrants to obtain a driver’s licence (Bray). State 
laws can thus be said to provide “pockets of inclusion or exclusion” 
(Gonzales, Lives 22) at one and the same time, and the diversity 
of regulations has a strong impact on how DACA is being expe-
rienced locally: “[R]espondents in North Carolina [for example] 
interpreted DACA as a more inclusive policy against the backdrop 
of a more hostile state climate, while respondents in Massachu-
setts found state-level policies to be more inclusive in the face 
of an insufficient federal-level action” (Cebulko and Silver 1561). 
Caught between state and federal policies, young people thus 
“simultaneously felt included and excluded in a complex and layered 
political environment” (1569). 
What this diversity of state-level regulations, combined 
with a lack of effective and stable protection at the federal level, 
can lead to in a worst-case scenario is illustrated by young immi-
grants who fall prey to the US’s current detention and deportation 
regime. According to Peutz and de Genova, deportation “has come 
to stand in as the apparently singular and presumably natural 
or proper retribution on the part of the state powers” against 
irregular migrants; it has become the primary way of enacting 
state sovereignty (1). In this sense, deportation is “a complex 
sociopolitical regime that manifests and engenders dominant 
notions of sovereignty, citizenship, public health, national identity, 
cultural homogeneity, racial purity, and class privilege” (2; emphasis 
in the original). Maira links the US’s current deportation regime 
to neoliberal capitalism and imperial domination, arguing that it has 
become “part of the normative regime of controlling and discipli-
ning bodies […] to ensure a docile workforce and target politically 
threatening dissent” (297–298, 299, 300). 
Increasingly, under-age immigrants become the targets of depor-
tation too once they leave the protected space of the public 
school system in their transition to adulthood. Jennifer Chacon 
in this context talks about a “school-to-deportation pipeline” (qtd. 
in Gonzales, Lives 27). And what is most problematic here is fact 





















immune to the threat of deportation, as is illustrated by the case 
of Daniel Ramirez Medina. When his undocumented father was 
arrested in February 2017, Ramirez was arrested as well because 
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement falsely claimed that 
he was “gang-affiliated” (Bolt): “The agents argued Ramirez’s 
tattoo, which reads ‘La Paz BCS,’ looked similar to a gang tattoo. 
Yet according to the Splinter report, the tattoo is a reference to his 
birthplace of Baja California Sur and does not share any similarities 
with gang tattoos” (Bolt). When Ramirez explained to the officers 
that he was legally in the country because of his DACA status, 
“the agent responded, ‘It doesn’t matter because you weren’t 
born in this country’” (Bolt). In May 2017, however, federal judge 
Ricardo S. Martinez, who openly condemned ICE’s racial profiling 
in this case, “ruled against ICE and accused the agency of lying 
to a federal court of law” (Bolt). “Martinez’s final ruling bars ICE 
from detaining, deporting or terminating Ramirez’s DACA benefits” 
(Bolt), but it cannot hide the fact that not even an active DACA 
status can provide a sufficient level of protection against the threat 
of deportation. On February 17, 2017, Juan Manuel Montes, 23, 
who had lived in the US since he was nine and also has an active 
DACA status, was actually deported to Mexico within three hours 
after being questioned by a US Customs and Border Protection 
Officer because he had left his wallet in a friend’s car and couldn’t 
produce his ID or proof of his DACA status (Gomez and Agren). 
According to United We Dream, an advocacy group working 
on behalf of young immigrants, at least 10 DACA beneficiaries 
are currently in federal custody and face threats of deportation 
(Gomez and Agren). And US Human Rights Network recently 
reported that Erold, another DACA recipient, has been detained 
at Stewart Detention Center in Georgia since August 4, 2018. 
While thus not even an active DACA status can protect indi-
viduals against immigration-related detention and deportation, 
this risk is infinitely higher for those 1.5 generation youth who 
did not or could not apply for DACA. Once they turn 18, a minor 
traffick incident such as speeding or driving without licence can 
lead to deportation. This increase in the number of deportable 
offences can be traced back to the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which recoded 
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“civil violations into criminal acts” while at the same time “expanding 
the categories of noncitizens eligible for deportation and […] res-
tricting the ability of migrants to appeal deportation” (Hagan et al 
1375–1376). According to IIRIRA, using a borrowed social security 
number, for example, was now classified as an aggravated felony 
(Menjívar and Abrego 1390). Peutz and de Genova in this context 
talk about “the sociolegal production of deportable populations” (2).
For young people who have spent most of their formative 
years in the US, getting deported to their country of birth often 
means returning to a country that they barely know and whose 
language they often do not speak. Due to their cultural identifica-
tion as “American,” many subsequently suffer from socio-cultural 
exclusion (Golash-Boza, Forced Out 184) when they find out that 
they “lack the linguistic, cultural, and social capital to successfully 
adapt to their countries of origin” (Silver 194). In the end, they 
often find they “lack social membership […] in spite of their citi-
zenship status” (194). Moreover, their deportation records can also 
have a negative impact on their job or educational opportunities 
in their country of birth (194). A case in point is the story of Katy, 
who came to the US from Guatemala together with her parents 
and her sister when she was two years old.11 While waiting for his 
asylum decision, Katy’s father managed to start several successful 
businesses (which is permitted under US law): “He was able to buy 
a spacious home, purchase five cars, and pay his oldest daughter’s 
college tuition” (Golash-Boza, “American Dreams” 134). Katy was 
14 when her father’s asylum application was finally rejected and her 
entire family was deported back to Guatemala. For Katy, returning 
to Guatemala meant a radical break with her prevous life in the US: 
“Katy went from living in a spacious, luxurious home in Louisiana 
to a one-bedroom shack with an outdoor toilet in Guatemala City.” 
As a result, “[s]he fell into a deep depression” (136). And what is 
more, “with no record of ever having studied in Guatemala, the public 
schools refused to enroll her […] . Unable to read or write Spanish, 
she never went back to school” (136). Today, Katy works in a call 
center in Guatemala City.






















Katy’s experience mirrors that of many young deportees who find 
out that the only work available to them is in call centers, due to their 
English language skills. Anderson has noted that “[t]ransnational 
call centers throughout Mexico actively recruit English-speaking 
deportees and facilitate their employment in ways that other 
industries and institutions do not” (206). As a result, “the call center 
sector has more than doubled in Mexico during the same period that 
millions of deportees have arrived in Mexico” (Golash-Boza, Forced 
Out 184). Anderson, who cites the example of a deportee working 
at TeleTech, a call center in Mexico City, also notes that “about 95 
percent of his fellow workers had returned or been deported from 
the United States” (203). This development can also be observed 
in other Central American countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras, but what is most worrying, according to Anderson, 
is the fact that in most cases deportees cannot depend on their 
own national or local governments to help with the reintegration 
process. In Mexico, for example, the government completely evades 
its responsibilities (207). Some countries such as El Salvador originally 
did introduce reception programs. El Salvador’s Bienvenido a Casa 
(BAC) was launched in 1998, but the fact that it was co-designed 
by the US State Department meant that by 2008, its function had 
shifted from reintegrating deportees to monitoring the deportee 
population (Hagan et al 1379). 
In other words, the US’s current immigration regime that is 
dominated by national security concerns and an overemphasis 
on deterrence, detention and deportation, can be said to have 
vastly detrimental effects for a generation of culturally and socially 
“Americanized” young people who had been brought up to aspire 
towards successful futures in the US, thus producing what Gonzales 
has termed “narratives of wasted talent” (Lives 211). But this effect 
is not limited to undocumented or liminally legal immigrant youth 
but increasingly also affects US citizen children.
2. the vulnerabIlItY of us cItIzen chIldren In IrreGular 
or mIxed-status famIlIes: lackInG aGencY and voIce  
In us ImmIGratIon laW
Several scholars have observed that the citizen children of irre-
gular immigrants face several disadvantages vis-à-vis peers who 
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live in families with a legal immigration status. Often their parents’ 
undocumented status limits their range of activities due to what 
Talavera has termed “solidarity in the face of unequal deportability” 
(186), which means that mixed-status families frequently only 
participate in activities that are considered “safe” for all family 
members. This can include sparetime activities, but frequently it 
also refers to a more limited access to social services. As Jacqueline 
Bhabha has noted: “children living with parents frightened of being 
arrested and deported […] risk being kept away from necessary 
medical services and other public situtations to avoid potentially 
devastating encounters with law enforcement and immigration 
agents” (Child Migration 7). In this sense one can argue that US 
citizen children growing up in irregular or mixed-status families 
are denied the full benefits of their citizenship status, despite 
their fully legal presence in the US, or more poignantly, that their 
parents’ irregular status in effect eclipses at least some of their 
rights as US citizens. As will be demsontrated in this section, this 
heightened vulnerability of US citizen children becomes particularly 
visible in the context of securing or preserving family unity. 
Bhabha has emphasized that almost all contemporary legal 
frameworks consider the notion of family unity as crucially 
important: “domestic, regional, and international laws consider 
the family the bedrock of society, and a key aspect of childhood” 
(Child Migration 22). Bhabha refers to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which states that: “The family is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protec-
tion by society and the State.” She also cites the 1989 Convention 
on the Rights of the Child as saying: “The family [is] […] the natural 
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members 
and particularly children” (22). In general, according to Bhabha, 
US law is committed to translating the principle of family unity 
into national legal practice. The US Supreme Court, for example, 
has established that “the Constitution protects the sanctity 
of the family precisely because the institution of the family is 
deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition” (22). Moreover, 
US immigration law has, since the 1960s, specifically privileged 
family reunification, which is proven by the fact that “[a]bout 





















to the family members of US citizens or lawful permanent resi-
dents” (Golash-Boza, Forced Out 69).
There are, however, situations in which the US’s current immi-
gration regime seems to produce the opposite effect: instead 
of facilitating family unity, it enforces family separation. And this 
inherently contradictory nature of family-related US immigration 
policies specifically manifests itself when US citizen children growing 
up in irregular or mixed-status families are faced with the depor-
tation of (one of) their parents. In this situation, the children 
frequently have to choose between leaving the US together 
with their non-citizen parent(s), or living permanently separated 
from them: “At its extreme, immigration law [thus] functions 
to deny the possibility of children living with parents or forces 
the de facto exile of children from their country of citizenship” 
(Thronson 237). In such cases, as Thronson has argued, the state 
not only fails to protect citizen children from such harm, but it 
actually actively causes it (237). In this way, one can argue, citizen 
children are unable to exercise their full citizenship rights but are 
instead assimilated to the immigration status of their parents.
A major piece of legislation that has produced such inherently 
problematic effects is the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which also tore apart 
the family of Ramón, a US citizen; his wife Lupita, a Mexican 
national and irregular immigrant; and their three US citizen children 
at the very moment when Ramón filed a family petition in order 
to legalize his wife’s status.12 Prior to 1996, irregular immigrants 
were able to adjust their status without leaving the US, but this 
245 (i) provision expired with IIRIRA in 1996. For this reason, Lupi-
ta’s immigration hearing was scheduled to take place at the US 
consulate in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. However, when Lupita left 
the US to attend her hearing, this automatically triggered a ten-year 
bar on re-entry (this regulation was also established by IIRIRA 
and applies to anyone who has lived in the US without authorization 
for a year or more). In other words, the process of legalizing Lupita’s 
status enforced a ten-year separation of the wife and mother 
from her husband and children.
12. This paragraph and the next summarize the story of this family as it has 
been documented by Gomberg-Muñoz (67–74).
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But things got even worse: Lupita’s application for naturaliza-
tion was eventually denied on the grounds that she had returned 
to Mexico to take care of her sick mother while living in the US. 
The fact that she had left the US and re-entered illegally afterwards 
made her permanently ineligible for naturalization because this 
automatically triggered a permanent bar on re-entry (likewise 
established by IIRIRA). As Gomberg-Muñoz notes: “Between 1996 
and 2001, the US Congress would periodically suspend the requi-
rement that undocumented applicants must leave the United 
States to apply for a green card, thus allowing them to change 
their status without triggering the bar” (71). But since 9/11, this is 
no longer possible. Lupita now lives in Mexico, trying to find work 
while the couple is struggling fiancially as Ramón has to take care 
of their three children on his own (72). 
Lupita’s case is far from being a particularly drastic exception, 
though.13 Thronson has observed that between 1998–2007, at least 
108,434 parents of US citizen children got deported, which has had 
a devastating effect on a vast number of families, but particularly 
so on their children, leading to trauma, insecure care, and very 
often also to the loss of a substantial part of the family income 
(246). Gomberg-Muñoz confirms that under current immigration 
law, bars on re-entry and/or removal procedures can be triggered 
very easily: “People can be barred from the United States for past 
drug and alcohol use, helping someone cross the border unlawfully, 
criminal and immigration violations, making a ‘false claim’ to US 
citizenship, and even having a ‘suspicious’ tatoo” (71). One can 
thus say that current immigration policy measures are designed 
in such a way that they can separate families—sometimes fore-
ver—at the very moment when these families try to stay together 
lawfully (73). In this way, US immigration law can potentially prevent 
many irregular immigrants from legalizing their status. On a more 
general level, one can thus note an inherent contradiction in current 
US immigration law “between a universal consensus on the critical 
importance of family unity for children and the reality of policy-in-
13. As Gomberg-Muñoz notes: “In 2011, Lupita was one of more than 20,000 
undocumented people who left their US homes and families in an attempt 






















duced family separation” (Bhabha, Child Migration 24). On the one 
hand, such a contradicition can be attributed to the state’s dual 
responsibility “to defend family unity and national self-interest” 
(25). But the main reason for this inherent contradiciton, I would 
argue, is the fact that children, in spite of their citizenship status, 
lack agency and voice in current US immigration law.
This becomes particularly clear in the ways in which people’s 
fear of deportation is currently being exploited. Golash-Boza notes 
that “less than 2 percent of undocumented migrants are [actu-
ally] apprehended every year” (Forced Out 85), but nonetheless 
the anxiety induced by the threat of deportation forces many 
mixed-status families to “structure[] their lives around the fear 
of deportation” (87). As mentioned above, this process had star-
ted with IIRIRA in 1996, which increased the number of offenses 
for which an immigrant could be deported, but the situation has 
worsened since then. While the number of deportations had 
already dramatically increased under President Obama, the lat-
ter still focused on the deportation of individuals who had been 
convicted of crimes. President Trump’s January 25, 2017 executive 
order “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United Sta-
tes,” on the other hand, now also includes immigrants who have 
only been charged with a criminal offense (“Executive Order”). 
As Gonzales cynically observes: “[I]n addition to terrorists, con-
victed felons, and gang members, parents and their children who 
do not qualify for asylum or other forms of relief remain a top 
priority for deportation” (Lives 228). The aim of these measures 
is, according to García, to spread fear, and to “advance attrition 
through enforcement” (90) by making it “‘as difficult and unple-
asant as possible to live here illegally’” (Thronson 245). Frequent 
traffic controls and workplace raids also play a major role in this 
context as they “produce precisely the sense of unease and fear 
that attrition advocates seek” (Thronson 245). 
Yet while seemingly targeting adults, these fear-inducing 
measures in practice affect entire families and have seriously 
detrimental effects on children. Hagan et al. note that public 
school enrollment has declined as a result of parents being afraid 
of deportation, for example (1378), which is confirmed by Bhabha, 
who observes that when George W. Bush increased workplace 
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raids, this led to declining school attendance in North Carolina 
and Ohio (Child Migration 275). But children also learn to live 
in constant fear: Talavera mentions the case of a 15-year-old 
teenager who is afraid of going out at all and stays home with her 
mum as much as possible (172). And Marta, a Salvadoran college 
student, admits: “Now, every day, I leave the house and don’t 
know if me or my parents will be back. It could be any of us, 
any of these days, and it’s so scary […] . We started to talk about 
what will happen with my little sister because she’s a US citizen, 
but who is she going to stay with here if we get deported?” (qtd. 
in Menjívar and Abrego 1400). In many ways, (citizen) children have 
thus become pawns in the hands of immigration policy makers, 
and they are being instrumentalized to regulate and control their 
(undocumented) parents’ lives and behavior. This is worrysome 
in any case, but particularly so when it curtails the rights and life 
chances of US citizen children.
Such rights violations regularly occur at the moment when 
deportation has become a reality: especially young citizen children 
often have no choice but to leave the US together with their 
parent(s). Prior to 1996, such an infringement upon the rights 
of US citizens could potentially have been averted by invoking 
the so-called “extreme hardship clause”: “[A]n undocumented 
alien without any criminal convictions and seven years continuous 
presence in the US could receive a suspension of deportation if he 
or she could establish the deportation would result in extreme 
hardship to the deportee or a US citizen or permanent resident 
spouse, parent, or child” (Bhabha, Child Migration 87; emphasis 
in original). Bhabha confirms that the standards for such a claim 
had always been very high: “Economic loss, inadequate medical 
care in the country to which deportation was to occur, and lower 
standards of education have all been considered insufficient 
to establish extreme hardship” (88). But after 9/11, a suspension 
of deportation due to extreme hardship has become pretty much 
unattainable, and according to Thronson, hardship to US citizen 
children no longer counts as an argument at all (240). Bhabha cites 
the example of a Mexican father who described “the untenable 
situation his three citizen children would face [in case he got 





















in Mexico, or economic hardship if forced to rely on the single 
income of their mother in the United States” (Child Migration 
63), yet to no avail. Frequently such hardship claims are rejec-
ted with reference to the fact that “‘Mexico is not Ausschwitz’ 
but a middle-income country with infrastructure and employment 
opportunities, suggesting that deportation should occasion little 
real hardship” (63). However, as Bhabha notes, “[a]ccounts provided 
by deportees contradict this glib argument. American children 
ripped out of the only home they have known endure traumatic 
experiences that can create lifelong scars” (63).
The US’s current emphasis on deterrence and deportation thus 
highlights the extent to which US citizen children lack enforceable 
rights in the context of US immigration law in order to preserve 
their family’s unity. When citizen children have to leave the country 
together with their undocumented parent(s), one can argue that 
the deportee’s irregular status has in fact overruled and eclipsed 
the child’s citizenship status. While parents are routinely allowed 
to align their children’s immigration status with their own, “children, 
on the other hand, are denied agency and opportunity to extend 
immigration status to their parents” (Thronson 238).14 They can-
not do so even in the context of preserving family unity, which 
is otherwise respected by both US national law as well as US 
immigration law, because “[t]he child’s interest in family unity 
is assumed to be value free as regards location” (Bhabha, Child 
Migration 37).15 According to Bhabha, this inherently contradictory 
legal situation can be attributed to the fact that “children only 
14. Cf. also Bhabha: “A citizen child cannot generally use the fact of citizen-
ship to block the removal of parents facing deportation or to secure entry 
for a parent abroad” (Child Migration 70). This was the initial goal of DAPA 
(Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents), 
which was announced in 2014, but blocked by a federal district court in Texas. 
The injunction has been upheld by the Supreme Court, so DAPA never took 
effect (Golash-Boza, Forced Out 52). 
15. Thronson notes that “US citizens may petition for their parents only 
when they are no longer children and have reached age twenty-one” (239). 
Cf. also Bhabha: “It is a strange paradox of modern public policy, that children 
are considered to have a fundamental right to family life and yet no legally 
enforceable right […] to initiate family reunion or resist family separation” 
(Child Migration 79).
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exist as parental possessions or rewards, not as active holders 
of the right to family life themselves” (58). But “[r]educing the citizen 
child to a ‘mere bystander’ in his or her parent’s deportation-sus-
pension proceedings denies the child constitutional due process 
rights” (89–90). In this way, the current US immigration regime 
structurally and systematically violates the rights of US citizens 
as “immigration law is designed not just to ignore the interests 
of children but rather to marginalize the role of children and thus 
the value placed on their interests” (Thronson 238). 
Bhabha argues that this situation can be attributed to “a deep-
-seated modern ambivalence about what it means for a child 
to be a citizen” (Child Migration 64). She distinguishes between 
a “liberal conception of citizenship as a bundle of rights and obli-
gations that is universal and inclusive—and that sets no age limit, 
no mental or physical competency requirement,” and a republican 
one which “entails the ability to participate in public deliberation” 
(64). According to the latter—republican—view, “young children, 
are not able to contribute to the res publica and are therefore 
not citizens” (64). The liberal view, as Bhabha notes, is implicit 
in international law whereas the republican one dominates “much 
[of] domestic family and social-welfare practice. It subordinates 
citizen children’s independent interests and agency to those 
of their adult mentors, reflecting the view that children belong 
to their families and depend on their protection, mentorship, 
and judgment” (65). For Bhabha, this constitutes a clear form 
of age-based discrimination. She compares this to earlier gen-
der-based exclusionary practices16: “Obliteration of the woman’s 
perspective [in US law] was justified by assumptions about her 
dependence—social, political, economic, and personal—on male 
relatives”; “she was considered an appendage of male agency 
and dependent on male protection,” and therefore, “her legal status, 
and with it her citizenship and immigration rights, flowed from 
those of her male relative” (78). An analogous line of argumentation 
is implicitly applied when denying children important citizenship 
rights. However, as the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Consti-
tution states: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
16. Cf. also: there was also a time when women only had “legally sanctioned 





















and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States” (“Amendment XIV”). And one 
of the citizen-specific entitlements, as Bhabha emphasizes, is 
“the guarantee of nondeportability, irrespective of criminal offen-
ding. Even treason cannot lead to deportation of a citizen” (Child 
Migration 67). Yet currently, citizen children become deportable 
by proxy because “[t]he one-way descending flow of familial 
transmission of citizenship, from parent to child rather than from 
child to parent, is accepted as a natural rather than a constructed 
asymmetry, just as its gendered antecedent was” (79). 
conclusIon: securInG the rIGhts of under-aGe chIldren 
and Youth In the current us ImmIGratIon reGIme
As the examples discussed above have shown, the US’s cur-
rent immigration regime shapes the everyday lives and modes 
of integration of both irregular migrant children as well as US 
citizen children living in mixed-status families. The first group 
includes young people who both socially and culturally identify 
as “American,” but when they turn 18, they begin to face multiple 
forms of legal exclusion. They thus encounter the paradoxical situ-
ation of being “simultaneously accountable to [US] law” but also 
excluded “from legal protections or rights” (Menjívar and Abrego 
1385). Upon coming of age, many of these young people also find 
their hopes of upward social mobility thwarted—with the possible 
exception of DACA beneficiaries, but even an active DACA status 
cannot provide any long-term stability or protection. For this reason, 
Jacqueline Bhabha refers to this generation of immigrant minors 
as “children without a state” because “despite having a nationality, 
they cannot turn to the state in which they live for protection 
or assistance” (Children without a State Preface xiii). Even though 
these 1.5 generation youth are of course not literally stateless, they 
can be termed as such because “their lack of a legally recognized 
status denies them practical access to the critical life opportunities 
that only a state can supply” (Legomsky 217). As Gonzales has 
summarized their predicament: “These narratives of wasted talent 
are a heart-breaking illustration of a dysfunctional immigration 
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system that persistently denies the futures of aspiring teachers, 
doctors, engineers, and architects” (Lives 211). On a very basic level, 
the precarious condition of these minors highlights “the need 
for policies that provide access to citizenship” (Cebulko, “Double 
Jeopardy” 82) and hence access to more stability, protection, 
and long-term perspectives for the kinds of immigrants who have 
managed to radically deconstruct the seemingly clear-cut binaries 
between “American” and “alien,” between “legal” and “illegal.” 
Otherwise, as Gonzales warns, “a sizeable population of US-rai-
sed adults will continue to be cut off from the futures they have 
been raised to expect” (“Learning” 616). What is more, they will 
be cut off from utilizing to the fullest their education, socializa-
tion, and enculturation to make the most valuable contributions 
to the society they live in and identify with.
Laws are socially constructed, hence illegality is also a category 
that is historically and culturally produced (Menjívar and Kanstroom 
5). 1.5 generation youth constitute a good example of a demographic 
group whose lived experience radically challenges the existing legal 
construction of “illegality.” Despite Obama’s assertion that young 
children brought to the US by their parents should not be held 
responsible for their parents’ actions, child migrants are often seen 
as both, victims and perpetrators at once, and lawmakers are often 
“mired between the pressure to protect rights and the obligation 
to punish juvenile offending” (Bhabha, Child Migration 13). But these 
young people who are, in Obama’s words, American in every respect 
but on paper (White House) defy the label of “offender” and deserve 
the opportunity to leave their state of liminal legality behind. Cur-
rent developments show that access to college and a temporary 
work permit (as provided by DACA) are not enough; they have 
to be combined with long-term legal residency. While immigration 
critics often counter such proposals with warnings about “ope-
ning the floodgates,” the number of eligible youth in this case is 
of manageable size. And while the benefits for the young people 
concerned are obvious, Legomsky also emphasizes the potential 
advantages for US society at large as “an underground shadow 
population is not healthy” in any case (231). 
But although US immigration laws are in principle meant 





















has illustrated that in effect they also target entire families, 
including US-born family members. In this way, US citizen children 
growing up in mixed-status families, for example, who would 
in theory have the right to enjoy the full benefits of citizenship, 
are in practice reduced to the irregular immigration status of their 
parents. If a young child’s parent gets deported, the child often has 
no choice but to leave the US together with him/her. This vividly 
illustrates how citizen children’s rights and protections are currently 
being curtailed and eclipsed in the interest of the US’s national 
security priority and its empahsis on deterrence and deportation. 
A possible argument in favor of granting US citizen children more 
agency in removal proceedings, offering more protection for their 
familial needs and rights, and integrating their perspective more 
explicitly in the institutional decision making process could be 
based on the so-called “best interests” principle as articulated 
in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 
3 (1) stipulates that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether 
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts 
of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” (United 
Nations).17 Even though this Convention has not yet been ratified 
by the US, its basic principles are consistent with a range of US 
laws and policies, including US child welfare policy, the standards 
by the American Bar Association, and not least US immigration 
law with its emphasis on family reunification. This shows that 
the US legal system is in principle not averse to protecting family 
unity and family reunification under specific conditions. Hence 
an adjustment of current deportation practices by reactivating 
the “extreme hardship” clause on the basis of the “best inte-
rests” principle could be seen in accordance with existing US legal 
practice, especially when the best interests concerned are those 
of US citizens.
Ultimately, the examples discussed in this essay emphasize 
the extent to which current US immigration laws and policies 
neglect or openly disregard the perspectives of one of the most 
17. Cf. also UNHCR’s Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child, 
which offers concrete and detailed advice on how to apply this principle 
in practice.
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vulnerable population groups: children—both immigrant children 
as well as US citizen children. Securing the rights of under-age 
youth and granting them a more audible voice in the US’s immi-
gration system by developing more age-sensitive policy measures 
is thus of paramount importance. And in the end, such a more 
child-inclusive migration regime will not only benefit the children 
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